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1. Introduction
The  Japanese  government  closed  the  failed  Long-Term
Credit Bank (LTCB) and Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) in
1998. These failures occurred during a turbulent period in
Japan, and there was a strong desire to dispose of the assets
of these banks quickly to avoid the possibility of further
regulatory  losses.  In  both  cases  the  Financial  Recon-
struction  Commission  (FRC)  invited  bidders  for  these
banks under the condition that sale was to take place too
quickly for standard due diligence investigations concern-
ing the underlying value of the failed banks’assets.
LTCB  was  sold  to  an American  investment  group,
Ripplewood Holdings. Because of the inability to conduct
due diligence investigations, Ripplewood demanded that
the Japanese government include put guarantees on the as-
sets of the failed bank, allowing the purchaser to return the
assets to the government for liquidation if their value fell
sufﬁciently  low.  Such  guarantees  had  been  used  in  the
United States in the savings and loan (S&L) crisis in the
late 1980s and early 1990s (Rosengren and Simons 1992,
1994).1
Japanese regulators quickly discovered that these guar-
antees inﬂuenced the acquiring bank’s management of the
failed  bank’s  loans.  In  particular,  the  acquiring  banks
demonstrated a reluctance to grant major concessions to
avoid the liquidation of problem loans. This reluctance ap-
pears to have been motivated at least in part by the com-
pensation from the put guarantees under liquidation.
In this paper, I review the circumstances surrounding the
sale of LTCB and NCB and the subsequent behavior of
their acquirers. I then review the U.S. experience with put
guarantee sales in the S&L crisis. I argue that the difﬁcul-
ties  experienced  by  the  Japanese  with  the  acquirers  of
LTCB and NCB matched those of the United States 10
years  earlier.  During  this  crisis,  the  Federal  Deposit
Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)  and  the  Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) offered put guarantees similar to those
offered by the Japanese regulatory agencies in the LTCB
and NCB transactions.
The U.S. regulatory agencies also noted difﬁculties with
put  guarantee  transactions.  First,  acquiring  banks  re-
sponded  to  the  guarantees  by  what  was  referred  to  as
“cherry-picking,’’retaining only assets with market values
that exceeded their book values and returning the rest to the
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1.In the absence of any guarantees, it would be expected that informa-
tion asymmetry problems, discussed in more detail below, would deteri-
orate the terms of sale. Indeed, the preponderance of empirical evi-
dence suggests that the bids in these transactions are low, in the sense
that winning bidders in failed bank auctions experience positive abnor-
mal returns (James and Wier 1987, Balbirer, et al. 1992, Gupta, et al.
1993). However, Gupta, et al. (1997) and Stover (1997) fail to ﬁnd sta-
tistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns for acquiring banks.2 FRBSF Economic Review 2002
FDIC. Second, the acquiring banks appeared not to put the
usual  level  of  effort  into  monitoring  and  administering
loans covered by the put guarantees (Bean, et al. 1998).
Put guarantees were abandoned in 1991; afterward, the
FDIC implemented loss-sharing arrangements in selected
purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions. Under these
arrangements, the FDIC agreed to absorb a portion of the
losses on covered assets, typically 80 percent, and the ac-
quiring  bank  was  responsible  for  the  remaining  losses.
These arrangements were implemented in 16 agreements
involving 24 failed banks between 1991 and 1993. As loss-
sharing arrangements typically were involved in the fail-
ures of larger banks, these agreements involved 40 percent
of the total failed bank assets resolved over this period
(Gallagher and Armstrong 1998).
As I demonstrate below, it appears that the U.S. experi-
ence with loss-sharing arrangements was positive. In par-
ticular, loss-sharing arrangements appeared to reduce the
regulatory burden of the resolution of bank failures in the
S&L crisis, even after adjusting for bank size. It appears
likely  that  the  Japanese  government  also  could  beneﬁt
from implementing loss-sharing arrangements in resolving
its bank failures.
To evaluate the advantages of loss-sharing arrangements
over put guarantees and the conditions that inﬂuence their
relative advantages, I introduce a model of the disposition
of failed bank assets. The model is a simpliﬁcation of that
in Spiegel (2001). There is a regulatory agency who auc-
tions off the assets of a failed bank to a set of competitive
potential acquiring banks. The regulator is assumed to lack
credibility in his designation of asset quality and instead
extends either put guarantees or loss-sharing arrangements
to insure the representative acquiring bank against loss.2
As in Hart and Moore (1998), it is assumed that the ac-
quiring  bank  can  proﬁtably  renegotiate  with  a  problem
debtor, while the regulatory authority cannot. This implies
that there are assets which are more valuable inside the
banking system than they would be to a nonbank such as
the regulatory authority. Under this assumption, liquidating
certain assets prior to sale is likely to be costly. Evidence in
favor of this assumption is provided by James (1991), who
argues  that  even  after  controlling  for  asset  quality,  the
value of assets is higher in the banking system than under
the receivership of the regulatory authority. This loss of
value is also known in regulatory circles, and is commonly
referred  to  as  the  “liquidation  differential’’ (Carns  and
Nejezchleb 1992). This condition implies that the exercise
of a put guarantee in this environment is costly because it
takes these assets out of the banking sector and thereby re-
duces their value.
In this simple model where the extension of such guar-
antees fails to inﬂuence regulator credibility and all agents
are risk-neutral, the results demonstrate that both put guar-
antees and loss-sharing arrangements reduce the expected
revenues to the regulatory authority. In the case of the put
guarantees,  the  loss  is  directly  attributable  to  the  dead-
weight loss associated with the probability-weighted retire-
ment of assets for liquidation that would be more valuable
under renegotiation in the banking sector. In the case of the
loss-sharing arrangement, the loss stems from the higher
administrative  costs  associated  with  maintaining  this
arrangement.3
I also examine how changes in underlying economic
conditions may inﬂuence the relative desirability of put
guarantees and loss-sharing arrangements. Below, I derive
an expression for the difference in administrative costs that
leaves the regulatory authority indifferent between offering
the put guarantee and the loss-sharing arrangement. I then
conduct  comparative  static  exercises  on  this  difference
with respect to parameters that are likely to change as eco-
nomic conditions worsen.
One  might  expect  that  the  loss-sharing  arrangement
would  become  more  attractive  as  economic  conditions
worsen. The reasoning would be that as conditions worsen,
the losses associated with unnecessary liquidation would
increase, making the put guarantees relatively more costly
to the regulator. Below I demonstrate that this is the case.
However, it also is likely that the share of loans that should
be liquidated would increase in an economic downturn.
This  effect  favors  put  guarantees  over  the  loss-sharing
arrangements. Below, I demonstrate that this is also the
case, leaving an ambiguous net impact of economic down-
turns on the relative desirability of loss-sharing arrange-
ments to put guarantees.
The remainder of this paper is divided into ﬁve sections.
Section 2 reviews Japan’s experience with the disposition
of the assets of LTCB and NCB. Section 3 reviews the
United States’historical experiences during the S&Lcrisis,
including its experiences with put guarantees and its even-
tual  turn  to  loss-sharing  arrangements.  Section  4  intro-
duces a formal model of the determinants of the relative
desirability  of  put  guarantees  and  loss-sharing  arrange-
2.Spiegel (2001) allows regulator credibility to vary with an exogenous
penalty function that measures the reputation cost of designating as-
sets improperly. Under this more general model, designations by the reg-
ulator may or may not be credible. Moreover, the credibility of the 
regulator can be inﬂuenced by the extension of put guarantees and loss-
sharing arrangements.
3.In a richer model where the credibility of the regulator is in question,
such as Spiegel (2001), either of these guarantees can potentially in-
crease expected regulatory authority revenues if the extension of such
guarantees  moves  the  regulator  from  lacking  credibility  to  enjoying
credibility.Spiegel / Disposition of Failed Japanese Bank Assets 3
ments in the disposition of failed bank assets. Section 5
concludes.
2. The Disposition of Assets Held by Long-Term
Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank
2.1. Long-Term Credit Bank
LTCB  was  declared  insolvent  and  closed  in  1998. Ac-
cording to common practice, the FRC evaluated the assets
to determine their suitability for sale to an acquiring bank.
Loans were given ﬁve grades: 1–Normal, 2–Needs atten-
tion, 3–In danger of bankruptcy, 4–Effectively bankrupt,
and 5–Bankrupt. (See Table 1 for details.) Loans in cate-
gory 1 were automatically classiﬁed as suitable for sale,
while loans in categories 3, 4, and 5 were automatically
classiﬁed  as  not  suitable  for  sale.  Those  loans  were 
absorbed by the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) for
liquidation.
The marginal loans from the viewpoint of assessing suit-
ability for sale were then those in category 2. Loans in cat-
egory  2  were  considered  unsuitable  for  sale  if  the
borrower’s capital account was negative (i.e., its assets fell
short  of  its  liabilities)  or  if  its  carried-forward  earnings
were negative. However, there was a provision that the lat-
ter criterion could be waived if the borrower had an accept-
able plan for ﬁnancial recovery within two years.
LTCB’s total assets in book value at the time of sale
equaled ¥24.6 trillion. Of these, ¥19.4 trillion initially were
classiﬁed as suitable and included in the sale. The initial
government outlays in assisting the resolution of LTCB
amounted to ¥6.4 trillion (see Table 2).4
It has since become clear that the government overstated
the  share  of  suitable  assets  on  LTCB’s  balance  sheet.
Recently released minutes of 1998 FRC meetings reveal
that the FRC deviated from the formal criteria described
above in assessing assets. For example, ofﬁcials consid-
ered potential support from main banks or the local gov-
ernment in assessing a loan’s risk of failure, although such
considerations  were  not  in  the  formal  rules.  Moreover,
much of the anticipated support did not materialize.
There were a number of potential acquiring banks bid-
ding  for  the  rights  to  LTCB.  These  included  a  foreign
group, headed by the Ripplewood Holdings Corporation of
the United States. This group was formally referred to in
the  proceedings  as  the  United  States  Investment  Group
(USIG).
The USIG bid was higher than those of the domestic
groups, but the group demanded that the government back
LTCB’s assets with a put guarantee. As such guarantees
were commonly extended in the sale of failed bank assets
in the United States, USIG claimed that it would be “com-
mon sense’’ to include such guarantees in the transaction.
At that time, however, there was no formal mandate for the
FRC  to  include  such  provisions  in  the  sale  of  failed
Japanese  bank  assets.  However,  ex  ante  estimates  sug-
gested that the regulatory losses from selling the bank to
USIG with the put guarantees would be signiﬁcantly less
than those that would be incurred by selling to the highest-
bidding  Japanese  group  with  the  required  write-offs.
Table 1
Borrower Classification Guidelines 
for the Japanese Government
1.Normal Strong results and no particular problems with
its financial position.
2.Needs attention Problems with lending conditions and fulfill-
ment, has poor results or is unstable, has prob-
lems with its financial position, or otherwise
requires special attention and management.
3.In danger Not bankrupt now, but is facing business 
of bankruptcy difficulties and has failed to make adequate
progress on its business improvement plan,
etc., so that there is a large possibility it will
fall into bankruptcy in the future.
4.Effectively Not yet legally and formally bankrupt, 
bankrupt but is in serious business difficulties from
which it is considered impossible to rebuild.
5.Bankrupt Legally and formally bankrupt.
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Table 2






Compensation for Losses after Failure
c 355 95
Asset Purchases by the DIC 305 319
Equity Purchases by the DIC 2,276 650
Underwriting of Preferred Stock 240 260
Total Initial Outlays 6,411 4,465
aFigures represent initial outlays. Actual resolution costs will be mitigated by 
recoveries on purchased assets and equities.
bRefers to government contributions at the time of the bank failure.
cRefers to government contributions while the bank was under public manage-
ment.
Source: Financial Reconstruction Commission.
4.Actual losses would fall below this ﬁgure.  Losses would be mitigated
by returns on purchased assets and equity as well as the lack of losses in
preferred stock underwriting.4 FRBSF Economic Review 2002
Consequently, the FRC decided to sell to USIG, inclusive
of the put guarantees. It stressed the minimization of the
“public burden’’as its motivation for choosing USIG.
The put guarantee allowed the “new LTCB,’’ as it was
originally known, to cancel a portion of the sale if an indi-
vidual loan was found to be defective and if its book value
fell 20 percent or more. Aloan was considered defective if
the “basis for judgment’’ used in classifying the asset as
suitable for sale turned out to have initially been mistaken
or to have subsequently become untrue.
The  details  of  the  put  guarantee  offered  to  the  new
LTCB were as follows: Loans whose sale were canceled
were returned to the DIC. The DIC was required to reim-
burse the new LTCB the value of the loan minus its initial
loan loss reserves (also minus any repayments that had
taken place). The provision lasts for three years, expiring in
March 2003. The guarantee was limited to loans exceeding
¥100  million.  However,  all  assets  exceeding  this  value
were fully covered. The guarantee required the new LTCB
to inform the DIC of its claims on a quarterly basis. Finally,
the guarantee provided some protection to the DIC against
systemic losses: Losses that could be attributed to a “major
event,’’ such as a deep recession, were not to be covered
fully by the DIC. Instead, the parties were to negotiate in
good faith over the extent to which a loan becoming defec-
tive was attributable to this major event.
There were three major channels through which a loan
could be classiﬁed as defective: ﬁrst, if its borrowing ﬁrm
was more than 30 percent below the target of its ﬁnancial
recovery plan; second, if strong ﬁnancial support from the
borrowing ﬁrm’s parent company, anticipated in classify-
ing  a  loan  as  appropriate,  did  not  materialize;  third,  if
the borrower was more than three months delinquent, if the
borrower went bankrupt, or if the borrower requested a
renegotiation of his credit terms. The bulk of reclassiﬁca-
tions was done under the ﬁrst channel.
The criterion of a 20 percent loss in book value was cal-
culated as follows: The initial value of a loan was equal to
its book value minus its loan loss reserves. For example,
suppose that a loan carried initial loan loss reserves equal
to 10 percent of its book value and collateral equal to 70
percent of its book value. Because of its loan loss reserves,
its initial value would be calculated as 90 percent of book
value, including 70 percent collateral and 20 percent own
risk.
Now suppose that the debtor went bankrupt. In that case,
the loan’s own-risk value would be reduced to zero and the
loan’s  present  value  would  be  reduced  to  its  collateral
value, or 70 percent of book value. The decrease in loan
value,  Φ,  then  would  be  calculated  as  the  percentage
change in initial value
Φ =
initial value − present value .
initial value





As 22 percent exceeds 20 percent, the loan in this example
would be a candidate for sale cancellation if the acquirer
could demonstrate that the loan was defective.
In June 2000, the new LTCB was launched as Shinsei
Bank. Almost since its inception, Shinsei Bank has been a
controversial  ﬁgure  in  Japanese  ﬁnancial  markets.  The
company has been actively introducing Western business
practices, including Western management techniques and
the promotion of women employees in management posi-
tions. The most controversial aspect of Shinsei’s behavior
is its relative unwillingness to roll over loans of problem
debtors.  The  contract  Shinsei  signed  with  the  Japanese
government was interpreted widely as suggesting that the
bank would be expected to pursue standard Japanese bank-
ing practices. In particular, the contract agreed that Shinsei
would “respond to funds demand, including rollover and
seasonal  funds,  for  three  years.’’ However,  the  contract
also contained a loophole which stated that Shinsei Bank
could deny rollovers if there were reasonable expectations
of losses.
In what was widely considered a departure from stan-
dard Japanese banking practices, Shinsei has been aggres-
sive  in  demanding  restructuring  plans  from  problem
debtors and has indicated that it would not shy away from
collateral seizure in the event of default. By September
2001, it was revealed that ¥558 billion in loans had been
returned by Shinsei to the DIC, at an initial outlay to the
government  of  ¥312  billion  (Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun
2001).5
Two of Shinsei’s most controversial decisions were its
denial  of  the  request  for  debt  forgiveness  by  Sogo
Department store and its takeover of the failed consumer
credit company, Life Co. Sogo’s plan to avoid liquidation
in July 2000 included $5.96 billion in debt forgiveness by
72 banks, including Sogo’s main bank, Industrial Bank of
Japan (IBJ). In addition, IBJ agreed to provide Sogo with
$272 million in new lending. Shinsei Bank disapproved of
the debt forgiveness plan and instead requested that the
DIC take over its assets. The DIC eventually agreed to re-
purchase Sogo’s debts at 80 cents on the dollar (Stover
2000).
5.This outlay represents the DIC’s purchase price.  The ultimate cost of
the guarantee will be reduced by the recovery on the repurchased loans.Spiegel / Disposition of Failed Japanese Bank Assets 5
Shinsei had been Life Co.’s main bank, and would have
been expected to provide it with ﬁnancial assistance under
standard Japanese practices. However, Shinsei refused to
provide additional assistance to Life, to the disappointment
of  other  creditors  who  had  extended  funds  to  the  ﬁrm.
Many speculated that Shinsei’s desire to take over Life was
motivated  by  the  potential  positive  impact  the  takeover
might  have  on  Shinsei’s  credit  card  business  (Nikkei
Weekly 2000).
The put guarantees included in LTCB’s takeover con-
tract clearly played a role in Shinsei’s unwillingness to roll
over the debt of existing problem debtors such as Life Co.
Shinsei announced that it would return all ¥120 billion of
Life  Co.’s  debt  to  the  DIC,  rather  than  reschedule  it.
However, the DIC refused Shinsei’s request to repurchase
the bad loans owed by Life Co., and the loans remained on
Shinsei’s  books.  The  DIC  defended  its  decision  on  the
basis that Life had been servicing more than 50 percent of
its debts, a ﬁgure far higher than that paid by other failed
ﬁrms whose assets were covered, such as Sogo.
2.2. Nippon Credit Bank
The terms of the sale of Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) were
similar to those of LTCB. In November 1999, the FRC re-
ceived  initial  proposals  from  a  number  of  competing
groups. The FRC held nine meetings over the next three
months,  after  which  two  groups,  Softbank  Group,  a
Japanese  group,  and  the  group  known  as  the  U.S.
Investment Fund were invited to give second bids.6 These
ﬁnalists were instructed to give more details about their
proposals for NCB’s recovery plan. They also were in-
formed  that  all  of  their  initial  bids  were  insufﬁcient.
Because of the precedent set by the LTCB sale, it was as-
sumed by all parties throughout the process that the ulti-
mate deal would include a put guarantee.
In February 2000, the FRC chose Softbank Group as the
priority party for negotiation. The transaction was delayed
by controversy over the put guarantee in the agreement,
partly because of the adverse experiences the government
had with the LTCB transaction. Nevertheless, the put guar-
antee remained intact.
Time constraints limited Softbank’s ability to perform
due diligence inquiries. The FRC placed a premium on
completing the sale of NCB as quickly as possible after
completing its assessment of NCB’s assets to prevent the
deterioration of its assets and to minimize the taxpayer bur-
den. Because of the short due diligence period, Softbank
was effectively limited to conducting interviews concern-
ing asset quality.
Relative to the LTCB decision described above, the de-
cision criteria used in choosing Softbank appears to have
given less weight to the consideration of mitigating tax-
payer burden. The FRC gave ﬁve reasons for choosing
Softbank: (1) the Group had a strong small-business cus-
tomer base and ties with regional ﬁnancial institutions; (2)
the  Group  would  actively  support  new  ﬁnancing  tech-
niques for venture companies; (3) the Group would use
new technologies, including Internet transactions; (4) the
acquiring Group was led by ﬁnancially strong companies;
and (5) the terms of the purchase satisﬁed the basic concept
of “minimizing public burden.’’
NCB was sold to Softbank on September 1, 2000, for
¥101 billion. At the time of sale, NCB had assets totaling
¥11.4 trillion in book value. The FRC designated ¥6.6 tril-
lion of these assets as suitable for sale to Softbank. Initial
outlays of government assistance for the resolution of NCB
amounted to over ¥3.8 trillion (see Table 2).
The bank was renamed Aozora Bank in January 2001.
After the fact, it was revealed that over a fourth of the as-
sets designated as suitable for sale by the FRC were actu-
ally  problem  loans. Again,  the  FRC  revealed  that  its
designation was based on “other factors,’’such as potential
main bank support, which were outside the formal terms of
its initial memorandum of understanding. While the FRC
appears to have followed the letter of its memorandum of
understanding with Softbank in its designation of assets, it
is clear that the regulatory agency used some of the discre-
tion allowed in the memorandum to improperly designate
asset performance. In particular, the FRC factored in non-
standard considerations, such as potential support for prob-
lem  borrowers  from  other  lenders.  It  also  exhibited  a
reluctance to liquidate loans from ﬁrms in sensitive indus-
tries (Shukan Bunshun 2000a, b).
As  a  result, Aozora  found  itself  immediately  facing 
bad loan problems. Roughly 32 percent of its loans were 
to  the  troubled  real  estate  sector,  while  an  additional  6 
percent  were  to  construction  ﬁrms.  It  was  generally 
agreed that NCB’s balance sheet was weaker than that of
Shinsei at the time of its launch. The bank’s ﬁrst president,
Tadayo  Honma,  committed  suicide  on  September  20,
2000, reportedly in part because of NCB’s formidable bad
loan difﬁculties.
In general, Aozora Bank has not appeared to be as ag-
gressive as Shinsei in refusing to roll over problem loans
and  in  returning  assets  to  the  DIC.  Nevertheless,  by
September 2001, Aozora Bank had returned ¥42.8 billion
in loans to the DIC at a cost to the government of ¥23.9 bil-
lion (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2001). 6.Softbank Group included Orix Corporation and Tokyo Marine and
Fire Insurance Company.6 FRBSF Economic Review 2002
2.3. Summary
The Japanese experiences with the sale of LTCB and NCB
reveal both the motivation for guarantees and the problems
the extension of those guarantees create: because of its re-
luctance to foreclose on problem borrowers, the FRC sys-
tematically  overstated  the  quality  of  assets  it  sold  to
acquiring banks (Shukan Bunshun 2000a, b). This resulted
in an asymmetric information problem between the seller
and its potential buyers, which was addressed through the
extension of a put guarantee. However, the put guarantee
created problems of its own. In particular, it gave the ac-
quiring banks the incentive to deviate from what was com-
monly considered standard banking practices to maximize
the beneﬁts of the guarantees that had been extended.
3. The Disposition of Assets 
during the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis
As discussed above, the Ripplewood Group that won the
bid for LTCB demanded the inclusion of put guarantees in
its sale because such guarantees had been commonly used
in the disposition of failed bank assets in Western transac-
tions. In this section, I review the U.S. experience with
such guarantees during its ﬁnancial crisis in the 1980s and
early 1990s.
Between 1980 and 1994, 1,617 banks with $302.6 bil-
lion in assets were closed or received assistance from the
FDIC. At the same time, 1,295 S&Ls, carrying $621 billion
in assets were closed by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) or RTC, or received assis-
tance from the FSLIC. These accounted for roughly one
out of every six federally insured ﬁnancial institutions and
20.5 percent of these institutions’assets. During the height
of the crisis period, 1988–1992, an average of one bank or
S&L was closed every day (Bean, et al. 1998).
The  method  of  asset  disposition  used  by  the  FDIC
changed  over  time.  In  the  1970s  and  early  1980s,  the 
FDIC typically was more concerned about the health of 
the newly created bank than about the sale of the assets 
of the failed bank. It typically only included cash and cash
equivalents  in  P&A transactions.7 Under  these  transac-
tions, due diligence was not required. Indeed, due diligence
often was avoided to maintain secrecy about impending
bank closures to avoid instigating runs (Bean, et al. 1998).
However, as the number of failures grew in the 1980s, 
limiting  sales  to  cash  and  cash  equivalents  quickly  left 
the  FDIC  with  unmanageable  levels  of  asset  holdings. 
In response, the FDIC began using put guarantees to facili-
tate the sale of all assets of a failed bank to a healthy ac-
quiring bank. Under these agreements, the acquiring bank
was allowed to return any assets it did not desire to the
FDIC for reimbursement for a limited period of time after
acquisition.
The RTC was established in 1989, immediately assum-
ing responsibility for 262 banks in conservatorship with as-
sets of $115 billion. Because of the large numbers of bank
failures during its operation, as well as chronic funding
difﬁculties, the emphasis in the RTC was on quick disposal
of assets. These initially were done in standard P&Atrans-
actions, but the RTC quickly began selling the assets of
failed banks separately from their deposit franchises. Of
the 747 failed institutions resolved by the RTC, 497 institu-
tions were handled through P&Atransactions. These insti-
tutions represented 73 percent of the value of the failed
institution assets handled by the RTC.
The RTC also used put guarantees during its ﬁrst year.
However, it quickly became clear that an undesirably large
portion of assets was being returned. Over half of the $40
billion in assets that were sold by the RTC subject to put
options were returned to the regulatory authority. It also
was clear that the acquiring banks were “cherry-picking,’’
choosing only assets with market values above book val-
ues and returning other assets. Moreover, there was some
perception that acquiring banks tended to neglect assets
during the period in which they were covered by the put
option, implying that the guarantee led to moral hazard in
the form of suboptimal monitoring activity. The put option
structure was discontinued in 1991.
In 1991, the FDIC turned to loss-sharing transactions to
sell the problem assets of large bank failures at superior
terms. These arrangements were offered on failed banks’
commercial loans and commercial real estate loans, but not
on family mortgage and consumer loans.
The typical terms of the loss-sharing arrangement were
that purchasers had a set period of time, typically three to
ﬁve years, to return assets to the FDIC in return for 80 per-
cent of net charge-offs plus reimbursable expenses. There
was a “shared recovery period,’’ during which the acquir-
ing bank paid the FDIC 80 percent of any recoveries on
loss-share assets previously experiencing a loss. This pe-
riod  ran  concurrently  with  the  loss-sharing  period  and
lasted one to three years beyond the expiration of the loss-
sharing period. The remaining 20 percent of losses were
assumed by the acquiring bank.
The  agreement  also  guarded  acquiring  banks  against
large downside losses. At the time of sale, the FDIC pro-
jected a “transition amount’’of ultimate losses the acquired
assets should face. Losses exceeding this transition amount
were covered at a 95 percent rate by the FDIC. 7.Cash equivalents included widely quoted assets, such as the bank’s
securities holdings, and were transacted at quoted prices.Spiegel / Disposition of Failed Japanese Bank Assets 7
There were a number of perceived beneﬁts of the loss-
sharing arrangement relative to the put guarantee frame-
work. First, the arrangement facilitated the fast sale of as
many assets as possible to the acquiring bank. In particular,
like the put guarantee, the loss-sharing arrangement miti-
gated the information difﬁculties that arose from the need
to dispose of assets quickly. The assets under the loss-shar-
ing arrangement also were sold too quickly for the acquir-
ing banks to conduct standard due diligence inspections.
Second, it was perceived that the loss-sharing arrange-
ment resulted in nonperforming assets being managed in a
way that aligned the interests of the FDIC and the acquir-
ing bank, as each held a partial equity stake in the underly-
ing  assets.  Since  banks  did  not  need  to  liquidate  their
claims on borrowers to activate their guarantees from the
FDIC, the guarantees did not encourage the early liquida-
tion of loans. To the extent that bank loans could be more
proﬁtable under a renegotiated settlement, the equity stake
held by the acquiring bank in the outstanding loan gave the
bank an incentive to undertake such renegotiation. This re-
duced the need for the FDIC to oversee the acquiring bank.
The FDIC entered into 16 loss-sharing agreements to re-
solve 24 bank failures between 1991 and 1993 (see Table
3). These included many of the largest bank failures of the
period, as loss-sharing arrangements were offered only if
the  pool  of  eligible  assets  exceeded  $100  million.
However, as most large failures were covered, the arrange-
ments were offered on a substantial share of disposed as-
sets: while only 10 percent of banks that failed over this
period had loss-sharing agreements, these agreements cov-
ered 40 percent of total failed bank assets.
The FDIC generally characterizes the loss-sharing expe-
rience as successful, and the method still is used today in
the  resolution  of  large  failed  bank  assets.8 Loss-sharing
arrangements are perceived to satisfy the criterion of mini-
mizing the taxpayer burden in the resolution of failed bank
assets. For example, there were 175 P&A transactions in
1991 and 1992 involving $62.1 billion worth of bank as-
sets. These failures were resolved at a cost of $6.5 billion,
or 10.4 percent of asset value. In contrast, the 24 loss-shar-
ing banks had assets worth $41.4 billion and were resolved
at  a  cost  of  $2.5  billion,  or  6.1  percent  of  asset  value
(Gallagher and Armstrong 1998).
As loss-sharing arrangements were limited to the largest
bank failures, it is likely that some of the discrepancy in
costs can be explained by economies of scale in the resolu-
tion of failed bank assets. As shown in Table 4, the average
resolution cost as a percentage of failed assets with or with-
out  the  use  of  loss-sharing  arrangements  is  greater  for
Table 3
FDIC Loss-Sharing Transactions, 1991–1993
($ millions)
Transaction Date Failed Bank Total Assets Resolution Costs % of Total Assets
09/19/91 Southeast Bank, N.A.
a $10,478 $ 0 0.00
10/10/91 New Dartmouth Bank 2,268 571 25.19
10/10/91 First New Hampshire 2,109 319 15.14
11/14/91 Connecticut Savings Bank 1,047 207 19.77
08/21/92 Attleboro Pawtucket Savings Bank 595 32 5.41
10/02/92 First Constitution Bank 1,580 127 8.01
10/02/92 The Howard Savings Bank 3,258 87 2.67
12/04/92 Heritage Bank for Savings 1,272 21 1.70
12/11/92 Eastland Savings Bank
b 545 17 3.30
12/11/92 Meritor Savings Bank 3,579 0 0.00
02/13/93 First City, TX-Austin, N.A. 347 0 0.00
02/13/93 First City, TX-Dallas 1,325 0 0.00
02/13/93 First City, TX-Houston, N.A. 3,576 0 0.00
04/23/93 Missouri Bridge Bank, N.A. 1,911 356 18.62
06/04/93 First National Bank of Vermont 225 34 14.97
08/12/93 CrossLand Savings, FSB 7,269 740 10.18
Total $41,384 $2,511 6.07
aRepresents loss-sharing agreements for two banks: Southeast Bank, N.A., and Southeast Bank of West Florida.
bRepresents loss-sharing agreements for two banks: Eastland Savings Bank and Eastland Bank.
Source: FDIC (1998).
8.For example, a loss-sharing arrangement was used in the resolution
of Mutual Federal Savings Bank of Atlanta in 2000.8 FRBSF Economic Review 2002
failed  banks  with  less  than  $500  million  in  assets.
Nevertheless, Table 4 also clearly demonstrates that loss-
sharing arrangements were associated with reduced resolu-
tion costs for banks with both more and less than $500
million in assets.
The limited number of loss-sharing arrangements sug-
gests that there must be disadvantages to the resolution
method  as  well.  First,  it  is  well-documented  that  these
arrangements  are  administratively  costly  to  implement,
particularly  for  small  bank  failures  (Gallagher  and
Armstrong 1998). Second, there is also a perception that
some potential acquiring banks do not want to be involved
in  loss-sharing  arrangements. There  is  a  fear  that  these
banks will refrain from bidding on failures that contain
such  arrangements  and  reduce  the  proceeds  from  their
asset sales.
Nevertheless, the successful experience of U.S. banks
during the S&L crisis, as well as the continued use of loss-
sharing  arrangements  today,  suggests  that  they  are  per-
ceived  in  practice  to  be  a  desirable  form  of  asset
disposition, particularly for larger bank failures. In the fol-
lowing section, I introduce a model of asset disposition and
formally  investigate  the  conditions  under  which  a  loss-
sharing arrangement may dominate a put guarantee as a
resolution method.
4. A Simple Model of the Disposition 
of Failed Bank Assets
4.1. Setup
In this section, I introduce a simple model that examines
the conditions determining the outcomes of failed bank
asset sales in the presence of put guarantees and loss-shar-
ing  arrangements.  The  setup  closely  follows  Spiegel
(2001), with the simpliﬁcation here that the regulatory au-
thority always lacks credibility, as discussed below. There
are three players: the regulatory authority who is selling the
assets of the failed bank, the representative acquiring bank,
and the representative borrower. All agents are assumed to
be risk-neutral and to discount at the market rate (which is
set to 0 for simplicity).
The structural form of the model is shown in Figure 1.
There are four periods, 0, 1, 2, and 3. Agents are assumed
to be interested only in maximizing period 3 wealth. In pe-
riod 0, the regulatory authority is endowed with the assets
of a failed bank that is assumed to be small relative to the
banking sector. These assets are all debt contracts calling
for a ﬁxed contractual payment from the borrower to its
creditor equal to D in period 2.
The borrowers underlying these assets are assumed to
have cash positions, C, that are unobservable to either the
regulatory authority or the acquiring bank. These cash po-
sitions are assumed to be protected from seizure by credi-
tors. However, as shown below, they can inﬂuence loan
payoffs under renegotiation. C is assumed to be distributed
on the interval (0,∞) with density function f (·) and cu-
mulative distribution F (·).
There  are  two  types  of  loans  in  the  population 
from  which  the  bank’s  assets  are  drawn:  A share
1 − π (0 <π<1) of the assets constitutes “good’’loans,
while  the  remaining π share  of  the  assets  constitutes
“bad’’ loans. Good loans and bad loans are identical ex
ante, and the analysis is conducted in terms of representa-
tive good and bad loans. For simplicity, I normalize the
Table 4
FDIC’s Resolution Costs as Percentage of Assets
1991–1992
Average Cost Median Cost
of Resolution (%) of Resolution (%)
Failed Banks with Total Assets over $500 million
With Loss-Sharing 5.38 7.77
Without Loss-Sharing 8.66 12.21
Failed Banks with Total Assets under $500 million
With Loss-Sharing 9.55 6.06
Without Loss-Sharing 15.82 17.10
Source: FDIC (1998).
Figure 1
Extensive Form of the Model
Period 0: (a) Regulatory authority (RA) offers put guarantee or loss-
sharing arrangement.
(b) RAdesignates share of good loans.
(c) RAsells assets to highest-bidding acquiring bank.
Period 1: (a) Loan types and cash positions, C, are revealed.
(b) If put guarantee exists, bank chooses set of assets to 
return to RA; RApays Λ to bank and liquidates assets.
(c) If no put guarantee, bank liquidates bad loans.
Period 2: (a) R2 is determined.
(b) Borrower decides whether to default or negotiate.
Period 3: (a) Borrower earns R3.
(b) If loss-sharing arrangement exists, bank earns Φ times
the difference between payoff on loan and its face
value.Spiegel / Disposition of Failed Japanese Bank Assets 9
asset size of the bank to 1, so that it is expected to have
(1 − π) good loans and π bad loans.
Good loans and bad loans are assumed to differ in their
investment opportunities. In particular, good loans are as-
sumed to behave similarly to the Hart and Moore (1998)
(HM) model. Renegotiation on a good loan is proﬁtable ex
post because the value of ongoing investments left in place
exceeds  their  value  under  liquidation.  In  contrast,  bad
loans face a return on reinvestment which is below the
market rate. This implies that liquidation is a ﬁrst-best out-
come for bad loans.
The sale of the failed bank assets also takes place in pe-
riod 0. The regulatory authority designates a share of the
failed bank’s assets as good loans, which then are auc-
tioned off. Competitive bidding is assumed to ensure that
assets designated as good loans are sold to the acquiring
bank at its reservation price.9 Loans designated as bad are
immediately liquidated. The acquiring bank is assumed to
face a ﬁxed cost b of administering an asset.
In the spirit of a rapid asset sale, the potential acquiring
banks are not allowed to conduct due diligence examina-
tions of the failed bank’s assets prior to acquisition. This is
modeled as the acquiring bank’s lack of knowledge about
the share of good and bad loans in the failed bank’s asset
portfolio. This leads to an asymmetric information prob-
lem between the regulatory authority and the potential ac-
quiring  bank  because  the  regulatory  authority  lacks
credibility concerning its designation of loans as good or
bad. Below, I conﬁrm that when the regulatory authority
lacks credibility, its optimal response is to designate all of
the loans as “good’’and offer them for sale. The acquiring
bank’s optimal response is then to assume that the proba-
bility that a loan actually is good matches to the population
probability, or 1 − π.
To mitigate the asymmetric information difﬁculties, the
regulatory authority can offer either a “put-guarantee’’or a
“loss-sharing arrangement.’’ These are offered in period 0
and are discussed in more detail below.
In period 1, the acquiring bank learns each asset’s true
type as well as its cash position. At that point, the acquiring
bank  can  exercise  its  put  guarantee  if  one  has  been 
extended.
Loans have divisible underlying assets that last two peri-
ods, and are worthless in period 3. These assets yield un-
certain returns R2 in period 2 and R3 or 0 in period 3,
depending on the loan’s type. Good loans are assumed to
have investments that yield constant returns R3 in period 3
(R3 > 0), while bad loans earn return 0 in period 3. R2
also is assumed to be normally distributed, with density
function h (·) and  cumulative  distribution  H (·).  These
funds also are assumed to be under the control of the bor-
rower and not subject to seizure by the bank. In addition,
any funds retained by good loan borrowers at the end of
period 2 can be reinvested in the project at rate of return s,
where s is a constant that satisﬁes




where L represents the liquidation value of the asset, which
is assumed to be a constant.10 The above condition implies
that  the  going-concern  value  of  the  project  exceeds  its 
liquidation value, so that liquidation is costly.
As stated above, the loans call for a ﬁxed contractual
payment from the borrower to his creditor equal to D in
period 2. The borrower has assets equal to C + R2 which
are not exposed to seizure. It follows that the borrower is
solvent if and only if
(2) C + R2 + L ≥ D.
If the borrower is solvent, he can either make the payment
D or choose to default. If the borrower is insolvent, he de-
faults with certainty.
If the borrower services his debt obligations or reaches a
renegotiation agreement with his creditor, he remains in
operation with his remaining investment in place. All pe-
riod 3 investment proceeds must go to the borrower, as his
creditor no longer has any bargaining power in period 3.
If the solvency condition holds with inequality, the en-
tire project need not be liquidated to service the borrower’s
outstanding debt obligations in full. Assumption (1) im-
plies that the borrower would always prefer to draw down
his cash position fully before beginning to liquidate his
project.
If the borrower defaults on his loan obligation, the ac-
quiring bank has the option of liquidating his investment.
In the event of default and no renegotiation, the project is
completely liquidated. In this case, the bank gets L, the 
liquidation  value  of  the  asset,  while  the  borrower  gets
C + R2 In practice, bad loans will be completely liqui-
dated.
However,  for  good  loans,  both  sides  can  do  better
through renegotiation since the rate of return on even rein-
9.James and Wier (1987) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the
number of bidders in a failed bank auction and the abnormal returns to
the winning bidder after the auction, suggesting that in practice compe-
tition among acquiring banks may not be perfect.
10.If L were allowed to be uncertain, HM show that the assumption
that its realization is nonveriﬁable would be necessary to prove that a
debt  contract  is  optimal.  Since  loss-sharing  agreements  require  that
losses be veriﬁable, that assumption cannot be used here. Therefore, I
take L as a constant.10 FRBSF Economic Review 2002
vested funds by the good borrower exceeds the market rate
of interest. As in HM, I assume that with probability α the
bank would get to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
borrower,  while  with  probability (1 − α) the  borrower
would get to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the bank.
Moreover, I assume that the outcome of the renegotiation
process is that the borrower makes an offer prior to the be-
ginning of the bargaining process equal to the expected
value of the payoffs to the creditor, which is always ac-
cepted. This payment is then made in period 2.
In period 3, the borrower earns the full proceeds of his
remaining investment in place. If the regulatory authority
has extended a loss-sharing arrangement guarantee, the ac-
quiring bank is partially compensated for its asset losses in
period 3.
The expectation of the acquiring bank concerning its pe-
riod 2 earnings will inﬂuence the value it places on the
loans of the failed bank both initially and in period 1 sub-
sequent to the realization of C. The details of the renegoti-
ation process are shown in the appendix. The expected
payoff from a good loan subsequent to the realization of C
is shown to be equal to G (C) − b, where G (C) satisﬁes









D (C, R2)h (R2)dR 2,
where R
∗
2 represents the realization of R2 at which equa-
tion (2) is just binding and D (C, R2) represents the pay-
ment by the borrower after renegotiation. As shown in the
appendix, D (C, R2) satisﬁes
(4) D (C, R2) = (1 − α) L
+α



















which represents the probability-weighted payoffs when
the borrower and the bank are allowed to make take-it-or-
leave-it offers respectively. I also demonstrate in the ap-
pendix that G
  (C) > 0 and G
   (C) < 0.
As it is clear that D (C, R2) > L when R3 > 0, the ac-
quiring bank would always choose renegotiation with bor-
rowers of good loans.
In contrast, since the return on investments in period 3 is
0 for bad loans, borrowers always default on bad loans sub-
sequent to the realization of R2 , and the asset is then liqui-
dated. The returns to the acquiring bank of a bad loan then
satisfy L − b.
4.2. Model with No Guarantees
To provide a benchmark to evaluate the proceeds of sales
under the different guarantees considered in the paper, I
ﬁrst evaluate the proceeds that the sale of the failed bank
would generate without any guarantees. Let Π represent
the payoff to the regulatory authority when no guarantees
are extended. As discussed above, since the regulatory au-
thority lacks credibility, it attempts to sell all of the assets
and  the  representative  acquiring  bank  assumes  that  the
share of unsuitable assets is equal to that in the population,
or π. The acquiring bank is therefore only willing to bid
π (L − b) for these assets. Π therefore satisﬁes
(5) Π = πL + (1 − π)G − b,
where G represents the expected return on good loans in




G (C) f (C)dC.
4.3. Model with a Put Guarantee
I next consider the extension of a put guarantee. I assume
that the acquiring bank can return its loan for a ﬁxed payoff
equal to Λ in period 1, where Λ > L, the loan’s liquida-
tion value. Since Λ > L, the acquiring bank will obvi-
ously choose to exercise its put option for all bad loans.
However, it is possible that it also may choose to exer-
cise the put options for some good loans. Recall that in pe-
riod 1 the acquiring bank also learns the cash position of
each borrower, C. Alow realization of C has adverse impli-
cations for expected loan payoffs. This raises the possi-
bility that the acquiring bank may wish to return a good
loan  with  a  sufﬁciently  low  realization  of  C.  Since
D (C, R2) > L, the exercising of the put option on good
loans  would  result  in  a  deadweight  loss,  because  good
loans are more valuable within the banking sector under
renegotiation than under liquidation.
To make the problem nontrivial, I assume that the put
guarantee is sufﬁciently valuable that the acquiring bank
would prefer to exercise it under some states of the world.
Since the minimum level of cash holdings, C, is 0, the re-
quired  assumption  is  that  the  put  guarantee  Λ is  sufﬁ-
ciently large that the acquiring bank would choose, if it
could, to return the asset upon discovering that the bor-
rower’s cash position was 0 but not as large as D , the
asset’s contractual rate of return.
It is straightforward that the acquiring bank will choose
to return a loan when its expected payoff falls short of the
put guarantee, i.e., whenSpiegel / Disposition of Failed Japanese Bank Assets 11
(6) Λ ≥ G (C).11
The  assumption  that  the  put  guarantee  is  sufﬁciently
large that it would be exercised in some, but not all, states
for good borrowers is then
(7) D > Λ > G (0),
which I adopt.
Deﬁne C
∗ as the borrower cash position under the put
guarantee for which condition (6) is just binding. I demon-
strate in the appendix that C
∗ exists and is a unique func-
tion of Λ, the size of the put guarantee. It follows that loans
will be returned if C < C
∗ and retained if C ≥ C
∗ .
Let V
p represent the acquiring bank’s valuation of a










G (C) f (C)dC − b.
Let Π
p represent the payoff to the regulatory authority
when a put guarantee of magnitude Λ is offered. As above,
since the regulatory authority lacks credibility, all assets
are offered for sale and the acquiring bank places the pop-
ulation probability 1 − π that loans are good. Π
p satisﬁes
(9) Π
p= [π(Λ−b) + (1 − π)V
p]
−(Λ−L)[π + (1 − π)F(C
∗)].
The ﬁrst bracketed term represents the proceeds from
the sale of the assets of the failed bank. It is equal to the
probability-weighted payoffs of bad and good loans, re-
spectively, in the presence of the put guarantee. The latter
term reﬂects the expected cost to the regulatory authority
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− b.
I next turn to the question of the implications of the put
guarantee on the expected net proceeds to the regulatory
authority from the sale of the failed bank. By equations (5)
and (10) the loss to a regulatory authority from introducing
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The above expression is negative because the extension
of the put option has no impact on the assets that are sold
by the regulatory authority. Both in the presence of the put
option and in its absence the regulatory authority offers all
of the assets of the failed bank for sale. The net loss is then
the sum of the probability-weighted expected losses from
the acquiring bank returning good loans which have had an
adverse cash position realization.
4.4. Model with a Loss-Sharing Arrangement
I next consider the extension of a loss-sharing arrange-
ment. I assume that the purchaser of the asset is guaranteed
a reimbursement of φ times the magnitude by which the
loan  payoff  falls  short  of  its  face  value  D,  where
φ ∈ (0,1). Let b
  represent the acquiring bank’s adminis-
trative costs of maintaining the loss-sharing arrangement.
In keeping with the literature, I assume that b
  > b, i.e.,
that the maintenance of the loss-sharing arrangement raises
the acquiring bank’s administrative costs.
Let V
l
b represent the expected return to the acquiring
bank of a bad loan inclusive of the loss-sharing arrange-
ment. Unlike the put guarantee case, under the loss-sharing
case the acquiring bank does not return assets to the regula-
tory authority. Bad loans are liquidated by the bank itself,
and hence yield revenues of L − b
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g represent the expected return to the acquiring
bank of good loans inclusive of the loss-sharing arrange-
ment. Moreover, let R2 (C) represent the realization of
R2 at which the borrower is indifferent between paying
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where the ﬁnal term represents the expected payoff from the
regulatory authority under the loss-sharing arrangement.
11.Note that I am implicitly assuming here that the ﬁxed cost of ad-
ministering the loan is paid whether or not the loan is returned. This is
for analytical simplicity and drives none of the results.12 FRBSF Economic Review 2002
Let Π
l represent the expected payoff to the regulatory
authority under a loss-sharing arrangement. As above, the
regulatory authority lacks credibility so that all loans are
sold  and  the  acquiring  bank  believes  that  the  share  of 




l = πL + (1 − π)G − b
  .
I next turn to the implications of the introduction of the
loss-sharing arrangement for the expected revenues of the
regulatory authority. By equations (5) and (15), the gains
from  offering  the  loss-sharing  arrangement,  Π
l − Π, 
satisfy
(16) Π
l − Π = b − b
  ≤ 0.
Again,  the  term  is  negative  because  the  loss-sharing
arrangement fails to alter the behavior of the regulatory au-
thority.  The  only  change  from  offering  a  loss-sharing
arrangement is then the increase in administrative costs to
the acquiring bank.12
4.5. Comparison of Put Guarantees and 
Loss-Sharing Arrangements
I next turn to comparing the payoffs from offering the loss-
sharing arrangement to those obtained under the put guar-
antees. By equations (15), (8), and (10), the net gain from
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0
(G (C) − L) f (C)dC
 
.
There are two components to the difference in revenues
between the loss-sharing arrangement and the put guaran-
tee. The ﬁrst term is negative, reﬂecting the additional ad-
ministrative costs under the loss-sharing arrangement. The
second term is positive, reﬂecting the fact that suitable as-
sets are never liquidated under the loss-sharing arrange-
ment  as  they  are  under  the  put  guarantee.  The  relative
merits of the two policies are then dependent on the rela-
tive size of these two components.
Finally, I turn to some comparative static exercises to
examine how changes in economic conditions can affect
the relative desirability of the put guarantee and the loss-
sharing arrangement. Deﬁne b
 ∗ as the administrative cost
of the loss-sharing program that leaves regulatory revenue
exactly equivalent to the put option guarantee under credi-
bility. By equation (17), b
 ∗ satisﬁes
(18) b
 ∗ = b + (1 − π)
  C∗
0
(G (C) − L) f (C)dC.
Changes  that  increase  the  relative  desirability  of  the
loss-sharing  arrangement  can  then  be  interpreted  as
changes that increase b
 ∗ . Differentiating b

































































∂C h (R2)dR 2
< 0.
It follows that a sufﬁcient, but not necessary, condition
for db

















h (R2)dR 2 < 1.
Since ∂D/∂L ≤ 1 by equation (4), the above condition is
relatively weak, suggesting only that the sensitivity of the
value of the asset under intermediation to the liquidation
value cannot exceed 1. Under this condition, an increase in
the liquidation value of the asset increases the relative de-
sirability of liquidation.
If this condition is satisﬁed, a decrease in L, the liquida-
tion value of the asset, raises b
 ∗ , the loss-sharing admin-
istrative cost that leaves the regulatory authority indifferent
between the put guarantee and loss-sharing arrangements
under credibility. In other words, a decrease in L, which
may  be  expected  to  accompany  a  deterioration  in  eco-
nomic conditions, would raise the relative desirability of
the loss-sharing arrangement over the put guarantee.
12.As in the put guarantee case, Spiegel (2001) also demonstrates that
the extension of a loss-sharing guarantee can increase the expected rev-
enues of the regulatory authority if it moves the regulatory authority
from the no credibility regime to the credibility regime.Spiegel / Disposition of Failed Japanese Bank Assets 13
On the other hand, it also is likely that a deterioration in
economic conditions would increase π , the share of bad
loans  in  the  failed  bank’s  portfolio.  Differentiating b
 ∗








(G (C) − L) f (C)dC < 0.
An increase in π reduces b
 ∗ because it lowers the
share of good loans. When there is a smaller share of good
loans in the economy, the losses from the put guarantee as-
sociated with the return of good loans are reduced.
It is therefore difﬁcult to make a general statement about
the marginal impact of a decline in economic conditions on
the relative desirability of put guarantees and loss-sharing
arrangements because these two effects go in opposite di-
rections. Adeterioration in economic conditions should re-
duce the liquidation value of assets. This would raise the
relative  desirability  of  the  loss-sharing  arrangement  be-
cause it would raise the cost of liquidation of good loans
under the put guarantee. However, one would expect that a
deterioration in general conditions also would reduce the
overall share of good loans. This effect acts to reduce the
relative  desirability  of  the  loss-sharing  arrangement  be-
cause it directly mitigates the severity of the problem asso-
ciated with the liquidation of loans that are more valuable
within the banking system.
5. Conclusion
This paper examined the circumstances surrounding the
sale of two failed Japanese banks, LTCB and NCB, and the
historical lessons provided by the U.S. experience during
the S&Lcrisis. In both cases, problems were created by the
provision of put guarantees. These guarantees, introduced
to address information asymmetry difﬁculties created by
the  need  for  quick  asset  sales,  created  moral  hazard
difﬁculties of their own. In particular, both in the Japanese
and in the United States’cases, acquiring banks were seen
to be reluctant to work with problem borrowers when they
possessed the alternative of exercising the put guarantee. It
was  argued  that  the  U.S.  experience  with  loss-sharing
arrangements suggests that these arrangements provide a
relevant alternative mechanism for addressing the informa-
tion asymmetries caused by the need for quick sales of
failed bank assets.
I then introduced a formal model of both put guarantees
and loss-sharing arrangements. The overall superiority of
either form of guarantee was shown to depend on the rela-
tive magnitude of the losses associated with loans being in-
appropriately liquidated from the banking sector under the
put guarantee and the higher administrative costs experi-
enced under the loss-sharing arrangement. In addition, the
impact of deteriorating economic conditions on the relative
superiority  of  put  guarantees  and  loss-sharing  arrange-
ments was shown to be ambiguous.14 FRBSF Economic Review 2002
Appendix
A.1. Renegotiation
As in HM, I assume that with probability α the bank would get to
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the borrower, while with prob-
ability (1 − α) the borrower would get to make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the bank. Moreover, I assume that the borrower
makes an offer prior to the start of renegotiations equal to the ex-
pected value of the payoffs to the creditor.
The  borrower’s  take-it-or-leave-it  offer  is  equal  to  L,  the
amount the bank could obtain by liquidating the entire ﬁrm. The
bank’s  take-it-or-leave-it  offer  requires  payment  sufﬁcient  to 
reduce  the  payoff  to  the  borrower  to  its  status  quo  value 
of C + R2 .
There are two possibilities for the bank’s payoff depending 
on the wealth of the borrower in period 2. First, suppose that 
the  borrower  is  relatively  wealthy.  In  particular,  suppose 
that C + R2 ≥ R3 . In this case, the bank will demand a cash
payment from the borrower equal to
C + R2 −
 




Second, suppose that the borrower is poor, i.e., that C + R2
< R3. In this case, some amount of liquidation will be required
to reduce the borrower’s period 3 payoff to C + R2. In particular,
the bank will demand all of the borrower’s cash, C + R2, plus
the proceeds from a partial liquidation of the asset. The bank will
demand that the borrower liquidate a share of the assets equal 
to 1 − (C + R2)/R3.  The  payoff  to  the  bank  in  this  case 
satisﬁes




























The payoff to the creditor under renegotiation then satisﬁes
equation (4),






















Defaults occur if and only if D ≥ D (C, R2). It follows that
the payoff will be exactly like a debt contract. If the bank does
not liquidate the loan in period 1, it receives D in period 2 if the
borrower is solvent and D if the borrower is insolvent. The ex-
pected payoff to a loan to a good borrower then satisﬁes equation
(3), where R∗
2 represents the realization of R2 for which equa-
tion (2) holds with equality.
To evaluate the model, it is useful to consider how realizations
of the borrower’s cash position, C, inﬂuence the expected payoff
to the acquiring bank. It is easy to show that G is increasing and










h (R2)dR 2 > 0
over the values of C for which ∂D/∂C is deﬁned. This includes
all values of C except C = R3 − R2 . At this value of C the pay-
off when the bank makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer is kinked.































A.2. Existence and Uniqueness of C*
Since cash holdings cannot be negative, existence follows di-
rectly from assumption (7) and the result in the appendix that
G(C) is strictly increasing in C. Suppose that C = 0 . By as-
sumption (7), the acquiring bank would choose to return the asset
to the regulatory authority at C = 0. Now consider the pay-
offs as C approaches inﬁnity. By equation (2), as C →∞the
probability of default goes to zero. It follows that G (C) → D
as C →∞. Since D > Λ by assumption, it follows that the ac-
quiring bank would not return the asset if C approached inﬁnity.
It follows that a unique value of C∗ exists. Moreover, C∗ is 
the value of C under which the constraint in equation (6) is just
binding.Spiegel / Disposition of Failed Japanese Bank Assets 15
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